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Abstract

On 22 December 2004, the President of the European Court of First Instance
issued an order rejecting Microsoft’s application for a suspension of the remedies imposed by the European Commission in its decision of 24 March 2004, effectively forcing Microsoft to provide interoperability information to rival server
operating systems suppliers, and to offer an “unbundled” version of its Windows
operating system without the Windows Media Player. The President found that,
while Microsoft had established a prima facie case on the merits, it had not proved
that it would suffer serious and irreparable harm from immediate implementation
of the remedies ordered by the Commission (see CLI 18 January 2005, p.16). Microsoft has since announced that it will not appeal the CFI President’s order to
the President of the European Court of Justice (Reuters, 24 January 2005). This
article first discusses some of the procedural issues highlighted by the President’s
order, and in particular examines the considerations that may have influenced Microsoft’s decision not to appeal. It then explores the potential significance of the
President’s statements about Microsoft’s prima facie case for Microsoft’s pending
main action for annulment (Case T-201/04).
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Competition and IP
Implications of the Court of First Instance’s Microsoft order
By Sven B. Völcker and Cormac O'Daly, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP*
On 22 December 2004, the President of the European Court
of First Instance issued an order rejecting Microsoft’s application for a suspension of the remedies imposed by the European Commission in its decision of 24 March 2004, effectively
forcing Microsoft to provide interoperability information to
rival server operating systems suppliers, and to offer an “unbundled” version of its Windows operating system without
the Windows Media Player.
The President found that, while Microsoft had established a
prima facie case on the merits, it had not proved that it would
suffer serious and irreparable harm from immediate implementation of the remedies ordered by the Commission (see CLI
18 January 2005, p.16). Microsoft has since announced that it
will not appeal the CFI President’s order to the President of the
European Court of Justice (Reuters, 24 January 2005).
This article first discusses some of the procedural issues
highlighted by the President’s order, and in particular examines
the considerations that may have influenced Microsoft’s
decision not to appeal. It then explores the potential significance of the President’s statements about Microsoft’s prima facie
case for Microsoft’s pending main action for annulment (Case
T-201/04).
Procedural issues
Some observers may have been surprised by Microsoft’s
decision not to appeal the order, given the company’s apparent
determination to exhaust all available legal remedies in defending its business practices against regulatory intervention.
However, a closer examination of Microsoft’s procedural
options reveals that an appeal was indeed unlikely to further
the company’s interests.
Any order by the CFI President in an interim measures case
is open to an appeal to the ECJ President on points of law.
Recent examples of such appeals in competition cases are IMS
Health and AKZO – both cases in which the Commission and
interveners supporting it had asked the President to set aside
orders granting a suspension of the Commission’s decision in
question.
By itself, such an appeal would not have suspended the CFI
President’s order or the operative part of the Commission’s
decision. In other words, regardless of whether it decided to
appeal, Microsoft would have had to implement the remedies
ordered by the Commission, unless it were to make an ex parte
request to the President of the ECJ asking that he temporarily
suspend the operation of the Commission’s decision, or the
Commission were to agree not to enforce the decision, as it
had done while the interim measures case was pending before
the CFI.

Immediately after the CFI President’s order, Microsoft
announced that it would begin implementing the
Commission’s remedies by creating a website giving
information on the licensing of communication protocols,
and by completing the testing of a “stripped down” version
of Windows and making it available to PC manufacturers
on the basis of a timetable agreed with the Commission. It
thus appeared somewhat unlikely from the outset that
Microsoft would seek to use the appeal procedure in order
to avoid prompt compliance with the Commission’s
remedies.
Rather, any appeal that Microsoft would have chosen to
bring would likely have been aimed at removing any parts of
the order that it may have considered prejudicial to other
future proceedings before the CFI, either the pending main
action or any fresh suspension applications that Microsoft
might choose to file.
As discussed below, it would appear difficult (and inconsistent with its public pronouncements) for Microsoft to argue
that the President’s statements on the merits of its case were on
balance prejudicial to Microsoft.
Moreover, as a procedural matter, it could be argued that
Microsoft would not have had standing to attack isolated
statements on the merits of its case, given the President’s
recognition that Microsoft had established a prima facie case
overall.
As regards any future applications for suspension, the order
itself points out that Microsoft is free to make such an
application at any time on the basis of new facts (para.325).
Conceivably, Microsoft could have sought to protect its
position in such future cases by alleging that the CFI order
establishes an unduly high standard of proof for the “serious
and irreparable harm” that is necessary for a successful suspension case.
However, such an argument would also appear very difficult
to make. The Court of Justice has in past cases emphasised the
considerable degree of discretion that the CFI President enjoys
in interim measures cases, in particular when making
assessments as to the serious and irreparable nature of any damage (para.72, citing Antonissen v Council and Commission at
para.28).
The order’s findings on this issue are highly fact-specific and
do not contain many statements of a more general nature that
would appear to be particularly good targets for an appeal on
points of law. Indeed, confirmation of the CFI President’s
approach by the Court of Justice could have detracted from
Microsoft’s chances of success in any future applications for
interim measures.

* Sven B. Völcker is a partner and Cormac O'Daly is an associate in Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale
and Dorr LLP, Brussels
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Implications for the main case
Given that the CFI President ultimately denied the urgency of
Microsoft’s application for suspension, it is intriguing that he
nevertheless engaged in a fairly detailed examination of
whether Microsoft had proved a prima facie case in challenging
the legality of the Commission’s decision.
It is, of course, tempting to speculate whether one can
divine anything about the outcome of the main case from the
President’s statements on the merits of Microsoft’s claims.
Indeed, Microsoft’s public statements indicate that it took a
fair degree of comfort from the order in this respect.
However, before engaging in such speculation, some words
of caution are in order. First, it should be recalled that the
threshold for finding a prima facie case is fairly low. Where the
order finds that Microsoft has succeeded in presenting a prima
facie case, it uses wording such as “[...] the prima facie case
requirement must be considered to be satisfied, regard being
had to the questions of principle raised by the case and to the
fact that certain pleas and arguments require a thorough
investigation” (para.204).
Second, while the President’s statements on the quality of
Microsoft’s prima facie case will clearly be taken into account by
the chamber deciding the case, they are not in any sense
binding on the chamber. A systematic review of the CFI’s case
law would surely uncover many instances in which the CFI
rejected applications for annulment that had been found to
present a prima facie case at the interim measures stage. The
President himself is not a member of the chamber deciding the
main case, and it would be futile to speculate whether the
order reflects some kind of informal consensus about the
merits of the case within the chamber – one could just as well
speculate that the order is designed to influence discussions
within the Court that have not yet produced any consensus.
With these caveats in mind, the order’s statements on the
merits of Microsoft’s case nevertheless make for interesting
reading, both as regards the licensing of interoperability
information and the tying of the Windows Media Player.
Interoperability information issue
Turning first to the interoperability aspect of the Commission’s decision, Microsoft had advanced three principal arguments. First, its refusal to supply information protected by IP
rights did not satisfy the necessary conditions for an
infringement of article 82 EC. Second, Sun Microsystems had
not asked for the information that the Commission’s decision
orders Microsoft to supply, and Sun’s request did not in any
event relate to the development of software in the EEA.
Third, the Commission had infringed the TRIPs Agreement
by ordering disclosure of the relevant information.
The order first dismisses the second and third arguments as
not disclosing a prima facie case. It states – as if incontrovertibly
– that the Commission’s decision established that Sun had in
fact asked for the relevant information and that there had been
no misunderstanding about the scope of Sun’s request.
The order also rejects the TRIPS argument because Microsoft had not expanded on it sufficiently for a ruling to be
made, and its general reference to documents annexed to its
pleading was impermissible under the CFI’s procedural rules
(paras.88, 201).
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While the unceremonious disposal of these arguments in the
interim measures case may not, as a legal matter, bar Microsoft
from attempting to rely on them in the main case, one would
nevertheless assume that the President meant to send it a fairly
clear signal to focus its litigation on potentially more promising grounds for annulment. Indeed, the assertion that Sun
never asked for the information seems somewhat pointless
given that Microsoft had refused to provide it during many
years of contentious administrative and court proceedings.
As regards the TRIPs arguments, the Commission had
already considered and rejected them in its decision (Decision,
paras.1052-3).
More interesting are the President’s statements concerning
Microsoft’s prima facie case with respect to the abusive nature
of its refusal to license information that may be protected by
IP rights. These statements have a certain Solomonic quality
in that they would appear to give both Microsoft and the
Commission encouragement.
In particular, Judge Vesterdorf pays more than a passing
regard to Microsoft’s argument that, in a case such as this, the
“nature” of the protected IP rights or their intrinsic “value”
must be taken into account. He recognises the secret nature of
the interoperability specifications as “fundamentally different”
from the information disclosed in IMS or Magill, describing
this latter information as “widely known” (para.207).
The Commission had argued that the “value” of the information in question was irrelevant in deciding whether a
compulsory licence should be enforced. According to the
President, “account must be taken more generally of the value
of the underlying investment, the value of the information
concerned for the organisation of the dominant undertaking,
and the value transferred to competitors in the event of
disclosure.” It will be interesting to see whether the chamber
will accept this as a framework for its analysis when considering the main case.
Taking account of the value of the underlying investment
appears, at first glance, to be consistent with the very rationale
of limiting compulsory licences to exceptional circumstances,
but the investment may be of a questionable nature if it is
primarily the result of tweaking interoperability standards to
make them proprietary. The “value of the information to the
organisation” and the “value transferred to competitors in the
event of disclosure” seem even more problematic as criteria
for the abusive nature of a refusal to license, as the “value” in
question may be proportionate to the exclusionary effects of
non-disclosure.
But there are also statements in this section of the order that
must be encouraging for the Commission and the parties
intervening on its behalf. The Commission had emphasised in
the Microsoft decision that, in its view, the Community courts’
case law, in particular Magill, did not imply that there is “an
exhaustive checklist of exceptional circumstances” justifying
imposition of a compulsory licence on dominant intellectual
property holders.
Before the CFI, Microsoft had argued the contrary, i.e. that
the conditions set out in Magill and more recently in IMS
Health are “necessary” for any finding that a refusal to license
IP rights is abusive, rather than simply “sufficient” for such a
finding.
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This legal question is important to the extent that there may
be doubts as to whether the Magill/IMS Health criteria are
satisfied in the present case. If the CFI finds that those criteria
are not “necessary” for a finding of an article 82 EC infringement, the Commission can rely, for example, on Microsoft’s
previous dealings with workgroup server operating systems
sellers – a factor that distinguishes the Microsoft case from
Magill and IMS Health (see CLI June 2004, at p.17).
President Vesterdorf states that the issue of “necessary” versus
“sufficient” “clearly [...] cannot be resolved at the interim
relief stage” (para.206). However, in the next sentence he adds
an obiter dictum pointing out that the ECJ actually uses the term
“sufficient conditions” in its IMS Health judgment. Given the
obvious significance of the question, one can only assume that
the President is intending to signal that Microsoft should not
place too much stock in the argument that Magill and IMS
Health are the last word on possible situations in which a
refusal to license IP rights can be abusive.
Requirement to unbundle the Windows Media
Player
Moving to the arguments relating to the obligation to produce
an unbundled version of Windows PC operating systems, the
President again begins by dismissing two of Microsoft’s weaker
arguments, i.e. that the Commission’s decision infringes the
TRIPs Agreement (see above) and that the remedies imposed
are disproportionate. With respect to both arguments, the
President complains that Microsoft had presented them “in an
excessively succinct manner” (para.393).
In dealing with Microsoft’s other arguments, the President
again makes some comments that may be viewed as
encouraging by Microsoft, whereas others point more in the
Commission’s direction.
The President finds that Microsoft’s arguments raise several
complex questions that cannot be regarded as prima facie unfounded in interim measures proceedings, i.e. the allegations
that
• by relying on “indirect network effects” resulting from incentives for content providers and application programmers, the Commission unlawfully applied a novel theory
on tying
• the Commission should have given greater weight to the
purported positive effects of the Windows “design concept”
• the Commission did not adduce sufficient evidence for its
indirect networks theory
• the Commission wrongly concluded that PC operating
systems and media players constitute distinct products
The President thus accepts, by and large, the way in which
Microsoft has framed the issues before the CFI, in particular
its claim that the reliance on “indirect network effects” was
not (yet) a well-established concept under article 82 EC.
However, the President also acknowledges the Community
courts’ case law (in particular Michelin II and British Airways),
according to which it is sufficient for a finding of an abuse
under article 82 that the abusive conduct “tends to restrict
competition or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of
having or likely to have such an effect.” These judgments thus
state that proof of actual anticompetitive effects is not
required.
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President Vesterdorf is not suggesting any departure from
this case law. Indeed, he acknowledges the possibility that
Microsoft’s bundling of the Windows operating system with its
media player may “by nature [be] likely to restrict competition” within the meaning of Michelin II and British Airways. If
the CFI finds this to be the case, any discussion about the
actual significance of indirect network effects would become
moot.
Conclusion
Microsoft’s decision not to appeal President Vesterdorf ’s order
highlights the de facto finality of any decisions made by the
Court of First Instance for plaintiffs in interim measures cases,
in particular on the issue of serious and irreparable harm.
On substance, the order contains some interesting statements that should help to frame and focus the discussion
before the CFI in the main case. However, it would be wrong
to assume that the order contains any clear indications of how
the CFI will decide the main case.
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